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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUES1
L

Did Ms. Huyot-Renoir Fail to Marshal The Evidence to Properly
Challenge the Jury Verdict?

Standard of Review:
When reviewing a jury verdict, appellate courts view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict. Harding
v. Bell 2002 UT 108,1f2, 57 P.3d 1093 (quoting State v. Krugen 2000 UT 60, % 2, 6 P.3d

*Ms. Huyot-Renoir's "Issues on Appeal" section of her Brief completely fails to meet
the important requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(5). Her "issues on Appeal" section is
more than eight (8) pages of a variety of information-mostly a re-arguing of her version of
what she perceives the facts and evidence to have been. She never properly sets forth any
issue, never provides a standard of review, does not properly cite to the Record, and makes
no indication at all that any such issues were preserved in the trial court. Thus, the Brief
should be stricken or disregarded, and the appeal dismissed pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24<j)
("Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken . . .."). Ms. HuyotRenoir's Brief is difficult to respond to in view of its non-compliant structure and content.
With that in mind, Ms. Wilkinson has done her best to respond to the Brief, and presents
proper issues before this court-without conceding that any "issues" have been preserved and
properly presented at all.

1

1116. To successfully attack a jury verdict, an appellant must marshal all the evidence
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support it. See Harding 2002
UT 108 atlf 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations omitted).
Preservation Below
Ms. Huyot-Renoir has not preserved a challenge to the jury verdict below;
she did not object to it nor file any post-trial motions. She challenges the verdict for the
first time on appeal.
II.

Did Ms. Huyot-Renoir Fail To Demonstrate Any Impropriety at
Trial?

Standard of Review
Ms. Huyot-Renoir concedes throughout her brief that trial courts are
afforded great latitude and discretion in the management of their court and the trial itself.
See, e.g., Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 1997)(cited in
Applt. Br. at7,21,and48).
Preservation Below
Ms. Huyot-Renoir has not properly preserved this or any issues below.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, rules, or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This personal injury action arises from an alleged rear-end automobile

accident which Ms. Huyot-Renoir claims occurred almost nine (9) years ago, in August
1997. The accident is referred to herein as an "alleged" accident because the Defendant,
Kathleen Wilkinson, denied being involved in the accident at all,2 because expert
testimony at trial demonstrated that the claimed damage to Ms. Huyot-Renoir's vehicle
from the alleged accident (an extremely small "scratch" or two in the bumper of Ms.
Huyot-Renoir's vehicle) could not have been caused by Mrs. Wilkinson's vehicle in view
of the physical measurements and characteristics of the two vehicles, and because the jury
found Ms. Huyot-Renior's claimed ailments were not caused by the alleged accident. Ms.
2

The fact that Ms. Renoir does not agree with Mrs. Wilkinson's testimony that she
was not involved in the accident does not make her testimony "perjury" as baselessly argued
by Ms. Renoir in her Brief.
3

Huyot-Renoir claims a host of physical ailments to the tune of several million dollars as a
result of this alleged accident.
B,

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
After several years of discovery, many delays, extensions of time, and one

last-minute trial continuance at the request of Ms. Huyot-Renoir, this case was finally
tried to a jury, with the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on January 24-27, 2005. The
jury returned a verdict of no cause of action, finding no proximate cause. A Judgment in
favor of defendant and against plaintiff was entered on February 28, 2005. The Judgment
itself reflects the fact that "[t]he Special Verdict was properly returned, dated, and signed
by the jury foreperson. No objections or exceptions were made to the final verdict before
the jury was released/' {See Addendum 1) No post-trial motions or objections were filed.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir filed a Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2005, and this appeal ensued.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1.

In a Complaint filed by former counsel for Ms. Huyot-Renoir, she

claims to have been injured in an alleged "hit and run" rear-end automobile accident
almost nine (9) years ago, on August 21, 1997. (R. 1-5)

4

2.

Defendant Kathleen Wilkinson denied being involved in the alleged

accident. (R. 1722 at 268:8-11 & 306:4-9.)
3.

The case was tried to a jury for four (4) days, January 24-27, 2005.

(R. 1720-1722)
4.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of no cause

of action in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff, finding no proximate cause. (R.
1649-1651)
5.

The jury verdict was reduced to a Judgment, which was entered on

February 28, 2005. (R. 1688; Addendum 1)
6.

There were no objections to the verdict or the resulting Judgment,

and no post-trial motions were filed. (Applt. Br. at 10)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial of this matter was conducted fully, fairly, and properly, and the
jury's verdict in favor of defendant, Ms. Wilkinson, should not be disturbed. If anything,
Judge Noel erred in Ms. Huyot-Renoir's favor throughout the long history of the case and
at the trial itself by giving her much more leeway and latitude than required. Now,

5

dissatisfied with the verdict, Ms. Huyot-Renoir is simply attempting to re-try her case on
appeal.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir utterly fails to meet the critical requirements for
appealing a jury verdict. She does not even attempt to marshal the evidence supporting
the verdict, despite acknowledging in her Brief that this is required. (See Applt. Br. at 4849). She fails to cite to the Record as required; instead, she simply states what she thinks
the facts and evidence were, or should have been, without demonstrating that such
information was ever presented at trial. She also provides no proper statement of the
issues with any standards of review or any indication that these "issues" were preserved
for appeal. The fact that she ultimately chose to represent herself affords her no special
treatment under the law.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir is improperly challenging a jury verdict by arguing that
her case should have been believed rather that Mrs. Wilkinson's. She does nothing more
than claim that the jury should have found in her favor in light of the evidence as she
perceives it to be. Rearguing her case is wholly improper and insufficient to overturn the
jury's verdict. When challenging a jury verdict, the appellant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the verdict, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites
6

cases confirming this requirement, but then instead of marshaling the evidence in support
of the verdict, she re-argues her view of the case in the light most favorable to her
version of events.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's Brief is fatally defective in other respects as well. For
example, she "dumps the burden of argument and research" on this court. Her "facts"
consist of nearly thirty-three (33) pages of one-sided, unsupported argument and reargument of the case below, without citation to the Record or any demonstration that such
information was ever presented at trial. In fact, much of what she now argues on appeal
was never presented at trial. Similarly her "Issues on Appeal" section consists of more
than eight (8) pages of argument, atid foils to comply with the requirement tllat the issues
be presented along with the applicable standard of review and supporting authority, as
well as a "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court."
Utah R. App. P. 24 (a(5)(A). Ms. Huyot-Renoir does not demonstrate that any of her
issues were preserved below, by objection, motion, or otherwise. The requirements
which she fails to meet are not mere technicalities, but rather important legal
requirements based on long-standing legal principles that allow an appellee to properly
respond, and this court to properly analyze and resolve litigated issues.

7

Ms. Huyot-Renoir's arguments about the manner in which Judge Noel
conducted the trial are also without merit. Judge Noel went the extra mile on many, many
occasions-not just during trial, but in the years before trial-to accommodate the plaintiff
and give her more than ample latitude, leeway, and consideration. Ms. Huyot-Renoir
cites the abuse of discretion standard concerning management of the trial court, but she
ignores the import of that standard when it comes to the trial judge's management of the
trial. The trial was conducted not only fairly, but with extreme deference and latitude to
the plaintiff. In the end, the simple fact remains that the jury heard the evidence and then
determined that there was no proximate causal connection between the claimed injuries
and the alleged conduct of the defendant, Mrs. Wilkinson. The jury's verdict and
resulting Judgment should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Ms. Huyot Renior Failed to Marshal the Evidence to Challenge the Jury's
Verdict, and Even if She Had Properly Marshaled the Evidence, there is
Ample Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict

\

Ms. Huyot-Renoir Must be Held to the Same Standard as if She Were
Represented by Counsel
Before discussing Ms. Huyot-Renoir's failure to marshal the evidence and

other failures, it should be noted that the law does not afford pro se litigants any special
treatment. Ms. Huyot-Renoir emphasizes that she is representing herself, but as a pro se
litigant Ms. Huyot-Renoir must be held to the same standards of practice as if she were
represented by an attorney. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 & 1220
(Utah 1983). "One has the right to appear pro se; but when a person chooses to do so,
[she] must be held to the same standard as if [she] were represented by counsel." Johnson
v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981), cited in Nelson, 699 P.2d at
1213 & 1220. A pro se litigant "cannot be given an advantage by virtue of [her] pro se
appearance, and [she] cannot be placed at a disadvantage thereby other than whatever
disadvantage results from [her] decision to proceed without the assistance of counsel."
Johnson, 630 P.2d at 517, cited in Nelson, 699 P.2d at 1213 & 1220; see also Manka v.
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Martin, 614 P.2d 875, 880 (Colo. 1980) (explaining that while a litigant is permitted to
present his own case, a pro se litigant's "ignorance [should not be] unjustly rewarded/'
and explaining that a pro se litigant who chooses to proceed without counsel "must be
prepared to accept the consequences of his mistakes and errors") (internal quotations
omitted), cited in Nelson. 699 P.2d at 1213 & 1220. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cannot be
afforded any special treatment just because she represented herself at trial.

B,

Ms. Huyot-Renoir Failed to Marshal the Evidence to Challenge the
Jury's Verdict
Ms. Huyot-Renior is appealing from a jury verdict. "A party claiming that

the evidence does not support a jury's verdict carries a heavy burden." Von Hake v.
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). To successfully attack a jury verdict, an
appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that,
even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is
insufficient to support it. See Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, ^ 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations
omitted). "Put differently, a party incurs an obligation to marshal all of the evidence that
arguably supports the jury's conclusion"

Id, (emphasis in original.) "This means that

[the appellant] must marshal 'every scrap' of evidence that supports the jury's finding."
I d (quoting Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724). To properly marshal
10

the evidence, then, the appellant must "assume the role of 'devil's advocate,' . . . fully
embrace the [appellee's] position," and then demonstrate how there is no evidence that
can support the jury's verdict. Id at ^(19-20. If a party fails to marshal (he evidence, the
court "must assume that the jury's conclusion was supported in the record." Hunt v.
Burton, 2005 UT App 441, f3, (attached as Addendum 2), citing Harding, 2002 UT 108
at f 19, 57 P.3d 1093. Ms. Huyot-Renoir acknowledges these requirements in her Brief,
but she completely fails to apply them.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir completely fails to even attempt to undertake the task of
marshaling the evidence at all, let alone meet her burden to do so. Instead of
"marshalling] the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrat[ing] that the
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict," Harding,
2002 UT 108 at ^ 19, 57 P.3d 1093, Ms. Huyot-Renior has simply reiterated her version
of the case at great length. She emphasizes her opinion of how the facts should have been
viewed, and insists that the evidence supports her position. This is clearly insufficient
when challenging a jury verdict. Ms. Huyot Renoir failed to assume the role of devil's
advocate; she never embraced the evidence that is favorable to the verdict, and then failed
to demonstrated how that evidence cannot support the jury's verdict. Instead, she simply
reiterated her distorted versions of the facts and the testimony of a multitude of witnesses.
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Because Ms. Huyot-Renoir failed to marshal the evidence, the court "must
assume that the jury's conclusion was supported by the record." Hunt 2005 UT App 441
at p (citing Harding, 2002 UT 108 at U 19, 57 P.3d 1093).
C.

Even Assuming Ms. Huyot-Renoir Had Properly Marshaled the
Evidence, there is Ample Evidence Supporting the Jury Verdict
Ms. Huyot Renoir did not even attempt to marshal the evidence supporting

the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
Even if she had attempted to do so, the evidence supporting the verdict was more than
adequate. A few examples follow:
1.

Dr. Moress Testified That There Was No Causal Link Between
the Accident and the Claimed Injuries

Dr. Moress' testimony supports the jury's verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir points
out that Dr. Moress testified that there was "no relationship between the accident and
[her] symptomatology," (Br. of Applt. at 19), and that "[her] injuries were not a result of
this accident." (Br. of Applt. at 22.) Indeed, Dr. Moress testified that, in his expert
opinion, he did not believe that Ms. Huyot-Renoir was injured as a result of the alleged
automobile accident. (R. 1719 at 25:5-16 & 62:2-23.) Dr. Moress further testified that
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's complaints reflected a psychological condition. (R. 1719 at 22:19 to
24:14 & 26:15 to 27:1.) The fact that Ms. Huyot Renoir admits that Dr. Moress testified
12

that there was no causal connection between the alleged accident and Ms. Huyot-Renoir's
alleged injuries is sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and the jury could have properly
concluded from his testimony that Ms. Huyot-Renoir's injuries were not caused by the
accident.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's complaints about Dr. Moress' opinions regarding her
damages, such as the necessity or advisability of a surgery on her neck are completely
irrelevant to this appeal. This testimony was related to the value of her claimed damages.
Thus, the testimony of Dr. Moress concerning the surgery ultimately turned out to be
unnecessary to the jury because the jury never reached the question of damages-having
concluded no proximate cause existed. Once the jury determined that there was no causal
connection between the alleged accident and the claimed injuries, there was no need to
address injuries and damages.
2,

Ron Probert Testified That There Was No Accident Involving
Ms Wilkinson

Ron Probert's accident reconstruction testimony also supports the jury's
verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir admits that Mr. Probert testified that "there was no physical
evidence to suggest that it did occur," (Applt. Br. at 37) and that the damage to Ms.
Huyot-Renoir's car could not have been caused by Ms. Wilkinson's car because the
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bumpers of the two cars did not match up. (Br. of Appellee at 35-38.) Indeed, Mr.
Probert testified that, in his expert opinion, Ms. Huyot-Renoir could not have been injured
as a result of the alleged automobile accident involving Mrs. Wilkinson because, he
opined, there was no accident between the plaintiffs car and the defendant's car. (R.
1718 at 17:10-17 & 29:18 to 31:23.) Thus, the jury could have properly concluded from
this testimony that Ms. Wilkinson did not cause the alleged damage and/or injuries
claimed by Ms. Huyot-Renoir.
3.

David Ingebretsen Testified That There Was No Impaet and No
Injuries

David Ingebretsen's biomechanical engineering testimony also supports the
jury's verdict. Ms. Huyot-Renoir admits that Mr. Ingebretsen testified that the physical
evidence indicated that there was "no impact" and that Ms. Huyot-Renoir's injuries "were
none," i.e., her injuries could not have resulted from the alleged accident. (Applt. Br. at
39.) Indeed, Mr. Ingebretsen testified that, in his opinion, there was no impact between
the plaintiffs vehicle and the defendant's vehicle, and therefore Ms. Huyot-Renoir could
not have suffered injuries from the alleged accident. (R. 1722 at 316: 1-24.) Mr.
Ingebretsen further testified that even assuming an accident between the two vehicles,
there was insufficient force to have caused Ms. Huyot-Renoir's alleged injuries. (R.
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323:11 to 324:11.) This expert testimony is sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and
the jury could rightfully conclude from this testimony that Ms. Huyot-Renoir's injuries
were not caused by the alleged accident with Ms. Wilkinson.
The aforementioned testimony and admissions by Ms. Huyot-Renoir are
just a brief sampling of the voluminous evidence that could—and did—lead the jury to find
in favor of the Defendant, Ms. Wilkinson. Further elaboration is not necessary in view of
the fact the Ms. Huyot-Renoir, and not Ms. Wilkinson has the burden of marshaling the
evidence. In short, Ms. Huyot-Renoir failed to marshal the evidence, but even if she had
marshaled the evidence, there is ample evidence supporting the jury's verdict.

N
I 1 s 11 ii) ill • iiffitiii has Dumped the Burden of Argument and Research
This may also properly dismiss Ms. Huyot-Renoir's appeal for "dumping
the burden of argument and research" and failing to comply with Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(9). Utah appellate courts are not "'a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research."' State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,
305 (Utah 1998) (internal quotations omitted.). Utah appellate courts do not address
arguments that are not adequately briefed. See, e.g., Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304-05 (citing
cases for the proposition that issues which lack legal analysis and authority in support are
15

properly rejected by appellate courts). An argument is adequately briefed if it contains
"the contentions and reasons of the [briefing party] with respect to the issues presented ...
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9). In other words, Rule 24(a)(9) requires citation to legal authority,
development of that legal authority, and reasoned analysis based on that authority, and
Utah R. App. P. 24(j) provides that non-complaint briefs may be "disregarded or
stricken." Ms. Huyot-Renoir has failed to present her appeal in a coherent matter as
required by Utah R. App. P. 24, and therefore this Court may disregard Ms. HuyotRenoir's appeal as an unnecessary burden on judicial resources based upon Rule 24(j) and
the "no dumping" rule.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir fails to identify any appealable issues or coherently
present any facts relevant to a legal issue on appeal. She fails to identify what her case is
about in her "Statement of the Case," (Applt. Br. at 1.), and in her section entitled "Issues
on Appeal," she fails to identify or coherently articulate any legal issues; and because she
articulates no legal issues, she also fails to identify how any issue was preserved for
review or the standard for review of any such issue. Her statement of facts consists of
thirty-six (36) pages of her own one-sided, distorted version of the "facts," without proper
record citations. (Applt. Br. at 9-43.) Ms. Huyot-Renoir5s argument section, entitled
16

"Summary Law Argument," clearly dumps the burden of argument and research. Ms.
Huyot-Renoir fails to develop any legal authority, and she offers no reasoned analysis
based on that authority. (Applt. Br. at 43-49.) She offers no legitimate reason or
supported argument why the District Court may have erred in nay respect. Finally, at the
end of her argument section, Ms. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites a handful of cases that articulate
what must be done to attack a jury verdict, but she does nothing to develop this legal
authority or apply it. (App. Br. at 47-49.) In short, Ms. Huyot-Renou has Mumped the
burden of argument and research," and as such her appeal may be properly rejected. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo. 1981) (dismissing pro
se appeal for the above-illustrated reasons).

111.

The Various Complaints Mae By Ms. Huyot-Renoir Throughout Her Brief
W Without Merit
Ms. Huyot-Renoir complains about many things in her Brief without

identifying any legal issues. Her "Issues on Appeal" section is not really a statement of
the issues on appeal at all, much less one complying with Utah R. App. P. 24. Instead, it
is a long and winding narrative of her version of what the evidence was, what the jury
should have believed, and how the trial should have been conducted. Ms. Huyot-Renoir

17

fails to set forth any issues, much less any standards of review for such issues, nor any
indication at all that any "issues" were preserved for appeal. Instead, she complains about
a variety of things at random throughout the Brief

These complaints need not be

reached by this Court at all in view of the foregoing arguments made in this Brief
Nonetheless, Ms. Wilkinson has attempted to address the many complaints that she
perceives to exist in the Brief for the sake of completeness and to demonstrate that even if
these had been properly preserved below and presented on appeal, none of them would
have any impact on the result in this appeal.
A-

Jury's Determination of No Proximate Cause
After four (4) full days of trial, the majority of which were dedicated to Ms.

Huyot-Renoir's case-in-chief, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff. The Special Verdict was signed, dated and returned. No
objections or exceptions were made to the final verdict before the jury was released, and a
Judgment was entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendant on February 28, 2005.
No post-trial motions or objections were made.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir concedes that the jury found no proximate cause, but she
still insists that the jury should have reached the "overwhelming" evidence of her claimed
damages. Ms. Huyot-Renoir misunderstands the law. It is simple, black-letter law that if
18

the jury finds either no negligence or no proximate cause, then that is the end of the
inquiry, and damages are not even to be considered, much less awarded. The Special
Verdict, which she approved before it was given to the jury, reflects these fundamental
legal requirements, and it was properly entered by the jury and incorporated into the
Judgment. Ms. Huyot-Renoir did nothing to preserve this issue below and did not make
any motions or objections to the Special Verdict Form or to the verdict itself once
rendered by the jury. To the contrary, she approved it before it went to the jury, and did
nothing until her Notice of Appeal to raise any concern about the verdict. While she
clearly disagrees with the jury's determination of no proximate cause, her dissatisfaction
with the verdict and her desire that they consider her claimed damages and award money
damages are misguided and have no basis in the law for revisiting the issue on appeal.
Moreover, she has completely failed to even attempt to marshal the evidence or otherwise
properly challenge the jury verdict.
B,

Denial of Legal Aid
Ms. Huyot-Renoir argues, with no proper supporting authority, that her

inability to obtain free legal aid to try her case is somehow grounds for appeal. This, like
the other issues raised, affords her no relief. The argument that England may do things
differently than the United States of America is not a viable argument that this case
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should be reversed on appeal. Ms. Huyot-Renoir did have counsel at various times in the
underlying litigation. Whether these attorneys withdrew of their own accord or whether
she dismissed them is unknown, but she did have representation at times. Ultimately, she
elected to try the case herself. Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites absolutely no authority for the
proposition that she is entitled to free legal representation in a civil, personal injury case.
Moreover, this issue was never presented below nor preserved for appeal.
C.

Ten (10) Day Jury Trial
Ms. Huyot-Renoir also complains that Judge Noel should have allowed her

ten (10) days of trial for this simple personal injury action. She was allowed to call more
than ten (10) witnesses within the four (4) day trial, and she was allowed by the Court and
counsel for defendant to take the vast majority of trial time. Judge Noel made it clearwell before trial commenced—that this type of case should last 2-3 days, that 4 days would
be more than adequate, and that she needed to plan accordingly. Ms. Huyot-Renoir was
allowed sufficient time to call her designated witnesses, and none of her witnesses were
prevented from testifying due to any time constraints.
As for Ms. Huyot-Renoir's physical ability to try the case, Judge Noel
continued the trial once at the request of her doctor, and trial then took place only after
Judge Noel had received written confirmation from Ms. Huyot-Renoir's own doctor that
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the proposed trial schedule would be acceptable in view of her claimed medical
condition(s). Throughout trial, Judge Noel consistently asked about her physical
condition and ability to continue, and she never indicated that she could not continue. To
complain now is to simply ignore her own conduct and acquiescence at trial. She always
consented to the trial schedule, and when asked if she was able to continue, she always
agreed.. She never objected to continuing on during any of the days of trial, and she
certainly makes no citation to the Record wherein she mad any such objection or request.
She cannot now use the length of trial days, especially where she consented to them, as an
excuse to overturn the jury's verdict. Again, as with the other issues raised in this appeal,
Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites no authority for the appropriate number of days for this simple
personal injury trial.
D.

CPA and Biomechanical Expert Testimony
Ms. Huyot-Renoir also contends that she should have been allowed to have

a CPA and a biomechanical expert testify at trial, or that Judge Noel should have let her
testify as an expert in those fields instead. She even goes so far as to say that Judge Noel
told her he would allow her to testify as an expert in these fields. This is not true and,
once again, she provides absolutely no citation to the Record to support that assertion.
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Judge Noel properly excluded these two experts well before trial. Ms.
Huyot-Renoir designated twenty (20) experts-including herself and her mother- but
never designated a biomechanical engineer or CPA as experts. While it may be true that
Ms. Huyot-Renoir retained them some time before trial, it is undisputed that she did not
ever disclose them to counsel for defendant, and neither of these experts ever produced an
expert report, as required under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See R.
1721, pp. 261-62). Hence, their exclusion was not only proper, it was required.3 Again,
Ms. Huyot-Renoir cites no authority at all for the proposition that she should have been
able to call these undisclosed expert witnesses at trial. Thus, for several reasons,
including the failure to provide a report or otherwise make their identity and opinions
known as required under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Noel
properly excluded these two experts from testifying at trial.
E.

Evidence of Future Medical Expenses
Ms. Huyot-Renoir also asserts that she should have been allowed to present

to the jury evidence of various future medical expenses. Contrary to her assertion in her
Brief, she was not told categorically that she could not present such evidence. A long

3

Judge Noel notes the long and tortured history of the case, and the many problems
occasioned by Ms. Huyot-Renoir. (R. 1721 at p. 262)
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discussion was held on the Record concerning this issue. (See R. 1721, at pp. 188-199).
Ms. Huyot-Renoir attempted to argue (and even testify herself) to the jury about future
medical expenses without ever having laid any foundation for them. Judge Noel did
allow certain future expenses to be argued to the jury (those with evidentiary support
presented during the trial), but he properly declined to permit her to simply attempt to tell
the jury what she thought her future expenses would be without any proper evidence
before the court. (See R. 1721 at pp 188-199).
More importantly, analysis of this issue by this Court is not warranted
because the issue is moot. The jury concluded that there was no causal connection
between the alleged accident and plaintiffs professes injuries. Thus, even if she had
presented everything she wished to present to the jury concerning damages, it would not
have mattered. Once the jury found no proximate cause, it properly ended its
deliberations and returned its verdict without considering any types of damages. Thus, all
issues concerning damages are irrelevant.
F.

Dr. Rosenthal
Ms. Huyot-Renoir argues that she should have been allowed to call Dr.

Rosenthal, one of her many treating physicians, to testify. Dr. Rosenthal was being called
only to discuss the cost of a certain medical procedure. She was attempting to call him as
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a fact witness, not an expert, but more importantly his testimony went only to the question
of damages (i.e. the cost of a certain procedure), and the jury never reached the question
of damages. Thus, this issue is also immaterial.
G.

Dr. Moress
In addition to complaining that Dr. Moress should not have testified about

the necessity of a neck surgery (See Section I B above), Ms. Huyot-Renoir also complains
that Dr. Moress should not have been identified as an "independent" medical examiner.
Ms. Huyot-Renoir cross-examined Dr. Moress at great length regarding the percentage of
work he does for defendants, as well as many other questions about practice, his methods,
qualifications, and other issues. Thus, she had ample opportunity on cross-examination to
demonstrate that, in her view, he was not an "independent" medical examiner. There was
simply no error.
Additionally, Ms. Huyot-Renoir's contention that counsel for Ms.
Wilkinson "promised" to modify the tape containing Dr. Moress' videotaped deposition
testimony is flatly wrong. The Record plainly shows a stipulation between the
parties-after a long discussion on the Record outside the presence of the jury-that all
videotaped depositions, including that of Dr. Moress, would be played to the jury "as is,"
with no modification or alteration at all. (See R. 1720, p. 70). This is yet another instance
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of Ms. Huyot-Renoir making statements and representations to this Court that either have
no support in the Record, or simply and plainly contradicted by the Record.

IV.

Improper Addenda
Ms. Huyot-Renoir's Addenda are largely irrelevant or improperly before

this Court pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1)(C) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Most
of the items are not properly part of the Record. For example, Addendum 1 (the
photograph of Plaintiff) is irrelevant, and her representation that this photo depicts her "as
the jury saw me" (Applt. Br. At 1) is untrue. She admitted in a recent deposition in
another matter (a case in which she is claiming that a spiritual blessing by representatives
of the LDS church in 2000 is the cause of her claimed injuries) that the photo is of her
head, but she cut-and-pasted it onto the body of someone else because "I like that dress."
{See Addendum 3). The only Addenda that are properly before this court are Nos. 2, 6, 8,
and 11, and those have no bearing on the outcome of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the jury's verdict
and resulting Judgment in favor of Defendant Kathleen Wilkinson.
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DATED this 3

day of February, 2006.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

T^RIAN C. WEBBER
MICHAEL K. WOOLLEY
Attorneys for Kathleen Wilkinson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
instrument were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, and as otherwise indicated below, on
this 3y^ day °f February, 2006, to the following:
BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR, pro se
1107 E. South Temple, No. 1
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Pro Se Appellant

x
G:\EDSI\DOCS\06016\2278\H08185.WPD
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ADDENDUM 1

AGED

F B IS TBfCTC0
BRIAN C. WEBBER [8018]
S . w
«RT
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
inird Judicial D^trict
Attorneys for Defendant
FEB 2 8 2005
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
pU-T LAKE COUNTY
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Deputy Clerk
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
ENTERED |N RBegTRy
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
0? I d^lor
DATE.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 010907017
KATHLEEN WILKINSON & JOHN DOE,
Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendants.
This action was tried to a jury, The Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on
January 24-27, 2005. Plaintiff was present and represented herself, pro se. Defendant was
present and represented by her attorney, Brian C. Webber, of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson.
At the close of evidence, jury instructions, and closing arguments, the jury entered its verdict, as
follows, on the Special Verdict Form:
1. Was the defendant Kathleen Wilkinson negligent as alleged by plaintiff?
ANSWER: Yes X

No

010907017

JD16848998
HUYOT-RENOIR.BONNIE

2. Was the defendant Kathleen Wilkinson's negligence, if any, a proximate cause
of the injuries sustained by plaintiff?
ANSWER: Yes

No

X

If you answered either question no. 1 or 2 "no" then do not answer any more
questions, but have the foreperson sign this form and return to the courtroom. If
you answered both question no. 1 and 2 "yes" then go on to the following
questions.
The Special Verdict was properly returned, dated, and signed by the jury
foreperson. No objections or exceptions were made to the final verdict before the jury was
released. The Court finds that defendant is entitled to costs as the prevailing party, pursuant to
Rule 54(d). Plaintiff is not entitled to costs.
NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered as follows:
1.

Judgment is entered against plaintiff and in favor of defendant. Plaintif

shall take nothing by way of any of her claims; and
2.

Costs are awarded in favor of defendant in the amount of $ ^rjlO

which shall constitute a Judgment against plaintiff.
DATED this ^-f

day of _

*L %*-

A

f V ^ ,

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

District Judge
"«*«K-->'

ll/brt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this Q(<A day of ^Aaa\^<^-. *, 2005, to the
following:
Bonnie Huyot-Renoir
187 E. 600 N.
Midway, UT 84049

X

6016-2278
G:\EDSI\DOCS\06016\2278\F59243. WPD
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ADDENDUM 2

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Vance Hunt,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 20050065-CA

v.

F I L E D
(October 14, 2005)

John Burton,
2005 UT App 441
Defendant and Appellee.

Second District, Ogden Department, 030904184
The Honorable Scott M. Hadley
Attorneys:

Rex B. Bushman, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Michael J. Boyle, Ogden, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Orme.
PER CURIAM:
Vance Hunt appeals from a jury verdict in favor of John
Burton. Specifically, Hunt argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's conclusion that while Burton
assaulted Hunt, the assault did not cause Hunt's alleged
injuries.
"A party claiming that the evidence does not support a
jury's verdict carries a heavy burden." Von Hake v. Thomas, 705
P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "To successfully attack the verdict,
an appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict
and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to
support it." Id. "Put differently, a party incurs an obligation
to marshal all of the evidence that arguably supports the jury's
conclusion. This means that it must marshal 'every scrap' of
evidence that supports the jury's finding." Harding v. Bell,
2002 UT 108,1(19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations omitted). Hunt has
wholly failed to meet his burden to marshal the evidence.
Hunt challenges the jury's verdict because while the jury
found that Burton committed an assault on Hunt, it did not find

that the assault caused Hunt the injuries or damages he claimed.1
Instead of marshaling all evidence that supports the juryfs
verdict, Hunt provides us with the testimony of his own doctor
who stated that in his opinion the assault caused the claimed
injury. This is not marshaling of the evidence that supports the
verdict. The record reveals numerous facts and inferences that
would support the jury's verdict. Hunt was required to marshal
these facts then explain to the court why they were legally
insufficient. Because Hunt has failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the jury f s conclusion that the assault did not cause
his claimed damages, we must assume that the jury's conclusion
was supported in the record. See id.
Affirmed.

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

1

Hunt does not argue that the jury erred by failing to award
him nominal damages. Accordingly, we do not address that issue
on appeal.

20050065-CA
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ADDENDUM 3

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

Civil No. 040500468

BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR,

DEPOSITION OF:
BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR

Plaintiff,

TAKEN:

January 23, 2006

CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a Utah
corporation, STERLING D.
ANGLE, GARY HANSON, and
Does I through V,
Defendants.

-ooOooDeposition of BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR, taken on
behalf of the Defendants, at the offices of Kirton &
McConkie, 1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple,
Salt Lake City, Utah, before Jill C. Dunford, Certified
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State
of Utah, pursuant to Notice.

-ooOoo-

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff
Pro se:

Bonnie Huyot-Renoir
1107 East South Temple, #1
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

For the Defendants:

Thomas D, Walk, Esq.
Christian S. Collins, Esq.
KIRTON 8c McCONKIE
60 East South Temple
Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120

I N D E X

WITNESS

PAGE

BONNIE HUYOT-RENOIR
Examination by Mr. Collins

2

filed?

pages.

A.

I'm not sure.

I haven't looked at it.

Q.

Well, actually we have gone through so many

Does it look like anything is different?
A.

It could be the exact one.

I haven't looked

Q.

I'm going to represent that it is the exact

at it.

7
8

one.

It's your brief.

We just photocopied it.

9

has your photo there in Addendum 1.

10

A.

Uh-huh.

11

Q.

Right there?

12

A.

Oh, uh-huh.

13

Q-

Is that a photo of you?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q-

The head and the body?

16

A.

Doesn't it look like me?

17

dress.

20
21
22
23
24
25

No, I like that

It's my head.
That's your head, but you put it on someone

18
19

It even

else's body?
A.

I like that dress.

That's the only photo I

had that was recent.
Q.

I'm going to actually attach this as Exhibit

2 to the deposition.
(Exhibit No. 2 was marked for identification.)
Q.

Do you have know any questions, Bonnie?
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